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A problem-oriented account of Organised Crime in the UK  
 
 
Introduction 
I first met Nick Tilley during 1996. I was a police officer with the Lancashire Constabulary 
and Pauline Clare, appointed as the first female Chief Constable within the UK, had recently 
joined us. She brought with her a form of leadership we were uninitiated to – consultative 
and evidence-based. Once an overarching policing strategy had been devised (to make the 
communities of Lancashire feel safe, involved and reassured), she turned her attention to 
how this should be delivered. To assist this decision the Chief Constable invited advocates of 
established policing approaches (community policing, intelligence led policing), together 
with those who championed newer variants (zero tolerance policing, Compstat, and 
Problem Oriented Policing (POP)), to visit and educate us on their respective strengths. Nick 
Tilley was one such speaker; he was also the most influential. His explanation of POP 
contained no fire and brimstone, just a simple, systematic logic that captivated the room. 
Whilst willing to challenge our misconceptions, he also sympathised with our predicament. 
He explained that policing and crime prevention are complex concepts, and whilst many 
efforts to prevent crime are well intentioned they are often badly implemented. He 
emphasized that understanding the realism associated with policing was critical to success. 
Ultimately his advice, in relation to a problem-oriented way of working, steered the 
Constabulary on a consistent (and successful) path for many years.  
 
Tilley’s influence will be seen in this chapter on UK based organised crime (OC), a subject 
that epitomises the complexity of policing and one on which he has published widely (see 
Tilley, 2016; Tilley & Hopkins, 2008; Hopkins, Tilley & Gibson, 2013). In tribute to Nick, the 
chapter is structured in a problem-oriented way. As such it will identify the problem of OC, 
analyse its elements and actors, discuss ways to tackle it, and explore how these efforts 
might realistically be evaluated. However, before doing so it is useful to provide some 
context. 
 
Organised crime – some overriding themes.  
Unpacking the term ‘organised crime’ is not for the faint hearted, as commentators refer to 
it as one of the most contested concepts in criminology (Levi, 2012). Whilst Woodiwiss 
(2001:3) describes it simply as ‘systematic criminal activity for money or power’, other 
academics and policy makers tease out numerous variables, which have generated 
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approximately 180 separate definitions (Von Lampe, 2017). Although space prevents a full 
discussion of these issues, it is important to outline some general points.  
 
For certain commentators, even the term ‘organised crime’ does not pass muster. Some 
argue the term ‘organised’ is a misnomer, as the process often involves chaotic actors. 
Others question at what stage the action becomes a crime, highlighting the ‘strong 
interdependencies between licit and illicit economies’ (Edwards & Gill, 2003:60), with Smith 
(1991) questioning where ‘shady dealing’ stops and organised crime starts. However, if we 
accept the term at face value, Albanese (2008) suggests Organised Crime Groups (OCGs) can 
be understood by either describing their criminal activity, or their group characteristics. In 
this way organised crime activity can be viewed as: the provision of illicit services (e.g. illegal 
dumping of waste; human trafficking); the provision of illicit goods (e.g. counterfeiting; 
controlled drugs); or the infiltration of businesses (e.g. fraud, money laundering, or 
extortion). Similarly, OCG characteristics have been listed as: profiting from crime; using 
force or threat; having a continuing organizational hierarchy; and maintaining immunity 
through the corruption of public officials.  
 
Opinion, concerning how OCGs are structured and operate has changed over time. Whilst 
early research emphasised a rigid leadership, hierarchical structure, strong group identity 
and internal discipline (UNICP, 2000:75), this model is considered outdated and in decline 
(Finckenauer 2005). Duijin et al. (2014) point out that in the last decade studies have 
increasingly pointed to non-hierarchical and flexible social networks that come together to 
form collectives. Europol (2015:12) endorse this by arguing, “The organised crime landscape 
in Europe will be increasingly dominated by loose, undefined and flexible networks made up 
of individual criminal entrepreneurs”.  They go on to say, “Criminals work on a freelance 
basis and are no longer part of a bigger network or group. Coming together as service 
providers to support project-based criminal endevours, they inhabit a broader criminal 
underworld, which is already heavily facilitated by the internet”. 
 
As no agreed definition exists it is difficult to accurately assess the level of organised crime 
or the harm it creates (Anderson, 1997; Burke, 2009). This absence of knowledge is 
compounded by several factors. First, although in theory, academic insight can be generated 
through observations and interviews, organised crime offenders (moreso than traditional 
offenders) crave secrecy to conduct their operations and are often willing to use violence 
and intimidation to maintain this.  Secondly, governments tend not to capture organised 
crime information in any systematic way; it is not a crime category, and official records 
prefer to record individual offenders against specific offences (e.g. drug trafficking or fraud) 
(Kohler, 2007). Thirdly, there is a lack of victimization or community surveys on the topic 
(vanDijk, 2007). All these factors mean that academic analyses of OC often rely on 
secondary information (von Lampe, 2012), with much of the empirical data drawing on 
proactive police investigations (van Koppen et al. 2010). As such there is an inherent bias to 
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the selection process, from which less obvious forms of organised crime, or more 
sophisticated offenders can potentially evade. This lack of data is further exacerbated as law 
enforcement agencies volunteer information reluctantly, due to reasons of operational 
confidentiality (Bullock & Tilley 2002). Overall these challenges generate a diversity of 
methodologies, routinely criticized by academics from Europe and North America (Tusikov, 
2012), and which serve to prevent comparative analysis (von Lampe, 2012) and dilute 
findings. Bearing in mind these challenges, the chapter now goes on to explore what is 
known about OC in the UK, some of which is based on empirical study, generated by myself 
or those I have had the fortune of being associated with. 
 
Organised Crime in the UK: Establishing the extent of the problem 
During 2005, whilst a Detective Chief Superintendent in the Lancashire Constabulary, I 
witnessed a milestone in the way the UK started to tackle OC. Her Majesties Inspector of 
Constabulary (HMIC, 2006), published a thematic review, ‘Closing the Gap’, which outlined 
the capacity and capability of police forces in England and Wales to deal with organised 
crime. It revealed numerous concerns, perhaps the most sobering disclosed that less than 
6% of known OCGs were being targeted. One of the responses was to create the Organised 
Crime Group Mapping (OCGM) project, which asked police agencies in England and Wales to 
identify and generate a threat score for their resident OCGs, based upon: (i) injury caused, 
(ii) community impact, (iii) reputational/ political impact (public attitudes of police 
impartiality and effectiveness), (iv) level of cross border offending; (v) economic impact; and 
(vi) criminal capacity/ capability (Gilmour, 2008; Tusikov, 2012: 107). This project also 
allowed the Home Office to aggregate the findings, giving rise to estimates that in 2015 
about 5,800 Organised Crime Groups (OCGs) existed, comprising 40,000 active offenders 
(HM Government, 2015). Further, using a frequency scale of high (5), to low (1) HM 
Government (2013:23) could show OCGs generally concentrated in urban Police Force 
areas. The Metropolitan Police, for example, was unique with a score of 5, with other major 
city Forces scoring 4, and the remaining areas scoring between 1-3.  
 
The OCGM project appears the most systematic approach ever instigated to monitor OCGs 
and its introduction was supported by a national strategy. The UK government defined OC 
as, ‘…serious crime, planned, coordinated and conducted by people working together on a 
continuing basis, their motivation is often, but not always, financial gain' (HM Government, 
2013:14). This, as with all OC definitions, is somewhat ambiguous and requiring 
interpretation by operational officers. To explore some of the operational issues that might 
affect the tackling of OC in the UK, I hosted a research workshop for 47 practitioners. These 
comprised senior leaders, operational officers and analysts from seven police forces in the 
North of England, North West Regional Crime Unit, and the National Crime Agency. These 
individuals were joined by two ‘serious case’ lawyers from the Crown Prosecution Service 
(CPS), and a representative from the Environment Agency (who were specifically interested 
in the rise of illegal tipping). The day’s workshop generally mirrored the same format as this 
 4 
chapter, exploring practitioner opinion on: the extent of the problem, its causal factors; 
ways to tackle it, and methods of assessing the interventions.  This information was 
captured throughout the day by asking participants to respond anonymously to a series of 
questions (some of which will be referred to later in the chapter). In relation to how they 
identified OCGs, 75% reported using the government (Home Office) definition, albeit 
highlighting it could be interpreted broadly. When asked what factors influenced their 
choice of organised crime category to concentrate upon, most (69%) stated they were 
influenced by their Chief Constable, 59% said they were also directed by the government 
(Home Office), although only 6% disclosed being influenced by community opinion.  
 
Delegates also mentioned three other factors that affected the prioritisation of OCGs. The 
most prominent related to firearms. The rationale behind this was that firearms were 
associated with immediate harm and since they were more likely associated with high 
profile drug trafficking (often linked with violent territorial wars and ‘taxings’), this type of 
crime was often prioritised above others. In fact, the practitioners thought human 
trafficking (34%), child sexual exploitation (31%) financial crime / fraud (25%) and 
cybercrime (19%) were the crime types most likely to be overlooked by the OCGM process 
for this reason. Secondly, practitioners highlighted that resources were also a factor. This 
was because they realised once an OCG was mapped this required immediate attention, 
which was problematic when resources were limited. Finally, practitioners were also 
concerned that similar problems may be scored inconsistently as there was no process of 
inter-rater reliability across the Force areas. Taking all these issues into account, whilst all 
delegates were extremely complimentary of the OCGM and its systematic approach, it 
illustrated the complexity of gaining consistent and robust OCG data.  
 
Different methodologies can reveal different perspectives. Whilst the OCGM exercise 
provides an ‘offender based’ methodology, an ‘offence based’ approach was used in a 
Home Office study (Francis et al. 2013; Kirby et al. 2016). This attempted to separate OC 
offenders from other offenders within the UK offender database (maintained on the Police 
National Computer). Such offenders were filtered on three variables: offence type (a list of 
probable OC offences was identified1), seriousness (the offender was convicted for a 
minimum of 3 years imprisonment), and evidence of co-offending. Over a three-year period 
(2007- 2010), 4,109 offenders were identified as OC offenders from a national sample of 
2.17m offenders (0.2% of the overall sample). Whilst numerous levels of analysis were 
conducted on the cohort (some of which will be discussed later), an early finding revealed 
the geographic spread of prosecutions was disproportionate. This distribution did not 
necessarily mirror general crime patterns, as some lesser populated but affluent areas 
showed a low level of general crime but a disproportionately higher level of organised 
                                                      
1 The Home Office list about 2,500 notifiable offence codes. Of these 46 offence codes were 
thought likely to involve OC and a further 139 possibly linked to OC (see Kirby et al. 2016).  
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crime. It was also observed that areas encompassing maritime ports appeared to have a 
higher association with organised crime prosecutions. This suggests further research on the 
geographic distribution of OC would be useful in allowing agencies to target their resources 
and skills more effectively in particular locations.  
 
The ramifications from OC can be seen from global to local level and in allocating resources 
to the problem it is important to understand the level of harm as well as its frequency 
(Duborg and Pritchard 2007). Hobbs (1988) suggests its economic impact is difficult to 
determine as drug offences (for example), can lead to an increase in theft, robbery and 
burglary, as addicts look to fund their habit. In turn, there are wider costs to health and 
productivity, as well as the emotional costs to victims of crime. The most recent Home 
Office analysis cautiously estimated that OC costs the UK £24 billion a year (Mills et al. 
2013:11). Whilst community surveys are rare, an isolated study by Bullock et al., (2009) 
surveyed 1000 community members between 2004 and 2006. The study discovered that 
70% of those surveyed thought the problem of organised crime was very serious with 67% 
feeling it had become more serious in the past two years. The survey also showed that 
whilst residents had limited knowledge of how OC might plausibly produce effects at street 
level, the threat of personal harm was more concerning than the wider impact at 
community (local) or society (national) level.  
 
An analysis of OCGs within the UK 
During the many hours Professor Nick Tilley spent providing me with advice about POP, 
some comments remain vivid. One of these was that unless a problem is analysed carefully, 
the response is unlikely to be effective. He also said that the analysis and assessment 
components of the much-used SARA2 model (Eck and Spelman, 1987) were often the most 
poorly served elements of the problem-solving process (see also Bullock et al, 2006). Of 
course, when this message was originally given I was an operational police officer, who 
regularly jumped prematurely between problem identification and response. Only when I 
started to evaluate the impact of these interventions did I become aware of my wasted 
effort. As mentioned at the outset, the OC subject area is often bereft of scientific 
validation. However, this section attempts to show what we do know about OC offenders in 
the UK, based on the available data. 
  
The Home Office figures described earlier suggest an average of 6.9 offenders per OCG, 
although some of these individuals may be involved in more than one OCG. Snow (2015) 
reviewed 145 offenders within 49 OCGs from the north of England and found 57% had 2 or 
3 members within each crime group. This finding more ably describes enterprise or 
                                                      
2 SARA is the most common operational model associated with POP. It is an acronym that 
distinguishes between the four elements of problem solving: (S)canning; (A)nalysis; 
(R)esponse; and (A)ssessment (see Eck and Spelman, 1987).  
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networking models than a more permanent hierarchical structure, such as the Costra Nostra 
or Yakuza. However, in the research workshop (described earlier) an overwhelming number 
of practitioners (91%) stated within their jurisdictions they could see both network and 
hierarchical OCG structures. Further, they felt they could also intuitively distinguish OCGs on 
specific criterion, including: operating level (local, national or international level); the threat 
and harm they posed; the type of crimes they engaged in; their level of resilience; and their 
propensity to violence.  
 
Within the OCGM process, offenders are separated into ‘principal’, ‘significant’, and 
‘peripheral’ categories. Whilst no formal selection criteria is apparent, ‘principal offenders’ 
can be viewed as those responsible for the control and direction of the OCG. ‘Significant’ 
offenders are those considered important to the group, but subordinate to the principal. 
Often, they can be trusted associates or have a specific expertise, crucial to the commission 
of particular offences. Finally, ‘peripheral’ offenders are those who are less significant to the 
group and are often transient; for example, they may be used solely as a driver or enforcer. 
In a study of 99 UK-based OC offenders, principal and significant members each comprised 
35% of the sample, whilst peripheral offenders accounted for 29% (Kirby & Snow, 2016). 
Snow (2015) also found principal offenders appeared to be older, enjoying a more stable 
lifestyle (associated with fewer house moves), whereas significant and peripheral members 
tended to be younger and move address more frequently.  
 
Assets can be a useful indicator of offender status. In fact, Sproat (2009:134) argued that 
assets from organised crime relate to about £18m, approximately 2% of the UK’s GDP. 
Assets can take various forms, with property being a particularly popular way to launder 
money as it allows for criminal proceeds to be mixed with rental income and other legal 
profits (NCA, 2016). Prichard (2008) points out that combining revenue, costs and 
investments/savings allows an estimate of assets to be made for the purposes of seizure. 
Unfortunately offenders become skilled at hiding their assets. In Snow’s (2015) study of 49 
OCGs, information relating to assets was available for 36. Of these, 69.5% had an estimated 
value of between £25,000 and £1m, with one OCG estimated to be worth over £10m and 
one group below £25,000. Snow (2015) discovered that older and more frequent offenders 
(defined by conviction rate) tended to have higher estimated asset values as did later onset 
offenders and those engaged in fraud and theft offences. Although currently underused by 
academics, asset monitoring appears a rich vein of analysis that can help describe and 
differentiate organised crime offenders and groups.  
 
One of the more recent research areas in OC revolves around the profiles and criminal 
careers of OC offenders. Previous Dutch studies have used an Organised Crime Monitor 
(which collates offenders who have been proactively targeted and prosecuted) (van Koppen 
et al., 2010). Analysis shows such offenders don’t commit OC as a first offence and exhibit a 
more persistent offending pattern than volume offenders. Many of these findings have 
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since been corroborated in the UK (Francis et al. 2013; Kirby et al. 2016). Indeed these 
studies highlighted convicted UK offenders were more likely to be male (95%), white 
European ethnicity (53.9%), and aged between 19-45 (86%). Overall OC prosecutions 
appeared to be dominated by drug offences (73.8%), which is a consistent finding across 
many studies. This was followed by sanctions for violent criminal activity (11.1%), 
commodity importation/ counterfeiting (6.8%), theft (5.2%), and fraud/ financial crime 
(4.9%).  One new and interesting finding was that non-UK offenders comprised 13% of the 
OC sample, with 58% of these having already been convicted of a criminal offence in the UK 
prior to being convicted for organised crime.  
 
Perhaps the most illuminating finding from this research highlighted the diverse range of 
pathways leading to organised crime. At one end of the continuum exist a significant 
number of early onset and persistent offenders. Here 40% of the OC offenders received a 
criminal conviction or caution prior to 16 years and 65.5% before 18 years of age.  However, 
in contrast, 10% of the cohort replicate the ‘adult late onset’ offender highlighted in Dutch 
studies (van Koppen et al. 2010). For this individual (aged 30 years or more), the organised 
crime offence is their first criminal sanction. Why they engage in OC at this later stage is 
currently unknown, however there are two potential explanations. First, the offender is an 
important facilitator and is approached because they possess a particular skill or 
professional connection (e.g. solicitor or transporter); second, his invisibility is maintained 
through being a particularly sophisticated offender, skilled at avoiding police attention. 
Francis et al., (2013) also examined specialization and escalation amongst the sample. 
Previous commentators had discovered the clear majority of general offenders do not 
specialize in particular offences (Soothill et al., 2008; Sullivan et al., 2009) and this pattern 
was replicated with these OC offenders. Only 11.8% of the cohort might legitimately be 
called ‘specialists’, the majority of these being associated with drug offences. Further, just 
under 20% showed a rapid escalation pattern, with an additional 5% showing some level of 
criminal escalation later in life. This corroborates other findings that suggest a significant 
number of OC offenders follow a persistent pattern of offending prior to the commission of 
OC.  
 
As well as the SARA model mentioned earlier, the Crime Triangle is another well established 
model that underpins a problem oriented approach. Based upon Routine Activity Theory 
(Felson, 2002), it acknowledges that crime occurs when a motivated offender, comes 
together at the same time and place, as a vulnerable victim, in the absence of a capable 
guardian. As such, the triangle stipulates that the characteristics of the victim and location 
should be analysed, as well as offender variables. A similar premise is true of OC. Many 
commentators have highlighted the importance of opportunity in crime (see Felson & 
Clarke, 1998), and this is true for OC, where opportunities are generated in a global 
environment (see Bullock et al., 2010). Europol (2016:10) explain how this works with 
human trafficking, highlighting the push and pull factors that make certain victims more 
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vulnerable. Push factors include: adverse personal situations, lack of education, 
unemployment, low living standards, and human rights violations. Further, they argue pull 
factors also materialize through wider environmental issues. These include: an increased 
demand for cheap labour and services; established foreign community networks across the 
EU; inconsistency of legislation across member states; porous borders; and the availability 
of cheaper, easier and faster travel. These factors all allow entrepreneurial offenders to 
exploit the potential for crime. Unlike general crime therefore, organised crime is more 
usefully considered as a criminal process, where offenders perform different roles, requiring 
different levels of resources and expertise. This means the trafficking of human beings (THB) 
involves a network of actors, from the person who coordinates logistics at a transnational 
level (e.g. false documents, transportation), to those who guard a ‘safe house’ containing 
trafficked women. Although involved in the same crime each of these individuals will have a 
different profile, and often require a different preventative approach, involving a wide 
range of agencies.  
 
To summarise, the diversity of criminal activity within organised crime, is vast. As such, 
focusing solely on the offender is insufficient to tackle the problem in any sustainable way. 
OC, as with other crime types, generally emanates from opportunity, requiring much wider 
analysis. This includes consideration of the actors involved (offenders, victims and 
facilitators), understanding where and how the profits are made, as well as identifying the 
stakeholders or guardians that might reasonably be expected to block these criminal 
opportunities (Kirby, 2013:159). As such, whilst some broad level of understanding can be 
made in relation to OC, at a tactical level (and in keeping with the chief tenet of POP), any 
intervention needs to be specific to the context. It is to the issue of response that the 
chapter now turns.  
 
The response to UK Organised Crime Groups: Enforcement, Disruption and Prevention 
Earlier sections of this chapter have explained OC as an umbrella term under which a 
diversity of offences occur. Castells (1996) was one of the first to argue that organised 
offenders have been quick to seize these wider commercial, political, and social 
opportunities in the pursuit of profit. This has been particularly evident with increased 
virtual and physical mobility enabling offenders to seize new routes to move people, money 
and products. In contrast, law enforcement agencies are built locally and constrained by 
legislation, boundaries, organisational bureaucracy and finite resources. As Ekblom (2003: 
257) points out, this ‘has set the scene for an arms race between prevention and organised 
offenders, especially where social and technological change constantly creates new 
opportunities for offending’. Whilst offenders are able to adapt quickly, law enforcement 
agencies are much slower to evolve. This has been graphically illustrated in the digital world, 
where police resources are ill prepared and under resourced. Faced with this dynamic 
environment, law enforcement agencies generally tackle organised crime using one of three 
approaches: enforcement, disruption, and prevention. 
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Enforcement  
Enforcement is synonymous with prosecution. It can be defined as a criminal investigation, 
which is specific to a particular person or group, and which results in the arrest and 
prosecution for the specific crime they are suspected. This is the traditional approach to 
dealing with crime generally, and often relies on a team of experienced detectives, who use 
a covert approach to gain evidence against a member or members of the OCG. This 
approach has considerable benefits, and perhaps, most importantly, underpins the 
realization of justice. If the process works as it should this is the foundation upon which 
civilized societies are built, facilitating public confidence by upholding the rule of law – 
sanctioning transgressors and protecting the innocent. The successful administration of 
justice can therefore (in theory), encourage victims and witnesses to come forward and 
deter vigilantism. It can also reduce reoffending by imprisoning and rehabilitating recidivists 
and acting as deterrent to those who pose a threat to society (Davis et al. 2005).  
 
However, in practice, there are many weaknesses associated with this approach. First, the 
various agencies involved in the CJS often find it difficult to work together (Auld, 2001). 
Second, there are more identified OC offenders than available resources to prosecute them. 
Third, OC investigations can be complex, costly, and difficult to implement. Cases often  
cross international borders, which are subject to different legislation, protocols, procedures 
and languages. Fourth, victims often disengage from prosecution as they face threats in 
relation to their own safety or that of their family (NHTRC, 2014). These challenges are 
particularly pronounced in the trafficking of human beings, as between 2010-12, although 
30,146 trafficked victims were registered across EU member states, only 8,805 prosecutions 
and 3,855 convictions followed (Eurostat, 2015).  
 
From a problem oriented perspective, enforcement is less effective in reducing organised 
crime. The impact of incarcerating the offender can be limited as others seek to fill the OC 
vacancy that has been provided, whilst some offenders continue their criminal operation 
from their prison cell. Similarly, the low probability of incarceration fails to generate a 
sufficient deterrent for many offenders (Kennedy, 2008). Nevertheless, culturally it remains 
a popular tactic as it epitomizes ‘real police work’ (Loftus, 2009), and involves the 
excitement of utilizing covert methods, such as informants, surveillance, and undercover 
officers.  
 
Disruption 
Disruption, has been defined as a ‘flexible, transitory, and dynamic tactic, which can be used 
more generally to make the environment hostile for the organised crime group….this 
approach focuses on disrupting the offender’s networks, lifestyles and routines’ (Kirby & 
Penna, 2010:205). This method uses any legal and ethical means to stop the offender from 
operating illegally. Whilst also regularly using enforcement approaches, these do not 
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concentrate upon the suspected organised crime offence, but on associated behaviour, 
which ordinarily would not be targeted. 
 
A disruption approach draws on Rational Choice Theory (Cornish & Clarke, 1986), which holds 
that if the cost of committing crime outweighs the benefits (broadly defined), it will be 
abandoned by the offender. This balance can be affected by: increasing the effort needed to 
commit the crime; increasing the risk of being caught; reducing the rewards from the crime; 
and removing the excuses to justify the crime. Kirby (2013:162) provides examples as to how 
specific interventions fit under each of these headings and the framework offers significant 
potential for a wide array of community safety partners to engage in this process. However, 
notwithstanding the creative potential of this approach, a variety of studies (Kirby et al.,2015; 
Kirby & Snow, 2016), found the arrest or prosecution for lower level offences (i.e. motoring 
offences), to be the most popular intervention, although four other general disruption 
categories were revealed: 
 
• Policing behaviours: which disclose to the suspect they are being targeted. This may 
involve a warning about their behavior or a request for information.  
• Specific investigation: most commonly seen with the use of search warrants, 
investigating a variety of issues (often unrelated to OC).  
• The control of assets: conducted using criminal (Proceeds of Crime Act) or civil powers 
(repossession of business or residential property).  
• The control or modification of a suspect’s behavior: This can include a variety of 
methods such as ancillary orders3 or use of harassment notices.  
 
Disruption approaches can involve an array of partners from the public and private sectors. 
With examples including the: Environment Agency, Local Authority Building Control (LABC), 
Vehicle and Operator Services Agency (VOSA), Department for Environment, as well as Food 
and Rural Affairs (DEFRA)). Such interventions can be generated at low cost, as the agencies 
exploit opportunities presented to them by the offender. The approach is culturally popular 
with practitioners, as it is action-orientated, involving a high level of enforcement (albeit not 
always involving prosecution) and allowing spontaneous or planned interventions. A small 
study (Kirby & Nailer, 2009) also found it popular with members of the community, who were 
pleased to see action being taken against high profile criminal offenders in their locality 
(normally invisible using covert approaches). Conversely, those who oppose ‘disruption’ 
argue this more creative use of legislation/enforcement make the police less accountable, as 
fewer traditional prosecutions are heard by the Court. This means offenders will have reduced 
access to legal representation and fewer opportunities to challenge police evidence in a public 
                                                      
3 The UK government has developed a variety of ancillary orders, designed to prevent or 
deter re-offending in organised crime. These include: Travel Restriction Orders (TROs); 
Financial Reporting Orders (FROs) and Serious Crime Prevention Orders (SCPOs). 
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court. However, these arguments can be countered by those who point out that this approach 
requires no additional police powers, nor breaches legitimate procedure. Further, the suspect 
who feels unfairly treated will always have an avenue to challenge police activity, be it 
through criminal or civil court, or other police oversight processes. Thus, any disruption 
strategy should be transparent (using civil and legal instruments as well general leverage), 
and there should always be clear and ethical engagement with suspects and their legal 
representatives (suspects should be aware of the reason surrounding law enforcement 
interest). Currently there appears no documented evidence of suspects successfully 
challenging disruption approaches by pursuing civil action on the grounds of harassment. 
 
Prevention  
Prevention is best understood as providing a sustainable means to tackle a crime event 
(Kirby & Penna, 2010:206). Its aim is to either change the physical environment or the 
human behaviour which generates the opportunity to commit OC. For example, a specific 
port exploited by human traffickers could be made less vulnerable through changing its 
structural design; redesigning documentation procedures; or increasing surveillance. A 
successful preventative approach therefore blocks the opportunity for a specific criminal 
process to occur - not just for one OCG but for all OCGs who may be attracted to that crime 
location or specific modus operandi. Prevention, is an approach that relies on more 
reflective, creative partnership working and is probably the least culturally popular with law 
enforcement agencies. As such there are few examples of it being implemented 
successfully. This was endorsed by the practitioner workshop mentioned earlier who 
disclosed enforcement was the most common approach, followed by disruption, and then 
prevention. For those interested in the subject of OC prevention, a useful text by Bullock et 
al. (2010) is dedicated to this subject. 
In summarizing this section, conceptual distinctions distinguish these three approaches 
(Tilley, 2009). Whilst enforcement is a reactive approach, disruption and prevention are 
proactive approaches. Disruption concentrates on the present, whilst enforcement 
concentrates on the past, and prevention focuses on the future (Tilley, 2009:3). Prevention 
concentrates on blocking the opportunity surrounding the crime event, whereas disruption 
(and enforcement) concentrate on blocking the offender. As such, whilst prevention 
provides the most sustainable reduction in crime, enforcement lies at the other end of the 
continuum as incarcerated offenders are often quickly replaced. Further, each of these 
themes have different objectives: prevention aims to reduce the frequency of a specific 
crime, whereas disruption aims to reduce the threat posed by a specific offender or crime 
group, and enforcement aims to facilitate justice through holding the offender publicly 
accountable (Tilley, 2009:3; Kirby & Snow, 2016). These three approaches vary in 
effectiveness, as the next section will explain. 
 
Assessing the impact of organised crime interventions 
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Problem solving is an iterative process (see Sidebottom and Tilley, 2010), and the evaluation 
element is critical. Her Majesties Inspector of Contabulary (HMIC, 1997; 2000) found 
‘assessment’ to be the most neglected stage of the SARA model (Eck & Spelman, 1987).  
Indeed the practitioners involved in the  research workshop, revealed this was completed 
infrequently and, if done, was most likely to encompass quantitative outputs, with arrest 
and imprisonment cited as the most commonly used indicators. Indeed, the practitioners 
argued the evaluation of OC required national guidance and training. Further, when 
prompted for research gaps within OC, many practitioners highlighted the importance of 
evaluation. They wanted to know what type of OC offender characteristics made them 
vulnerable to policing interventions; what interventions were most successful (and in what 
context); and how OC interventions should be evaluated.  
 
Establishing a process to monitor how inputs are transferred into outputs and then into 
outcomes, can be complex. Within this process, it is important to understand how specific 
mechanisms, underpinning the policy/practice/ or programme, can produce an impact and 
under what conditions (Johnson et al., 2015). The process also relies on the ability to 
identify indicators that can illustrate material change in demanding operational 
circumstances (Pawson & Tilley, 1997). Unsurprisingly, methods to identify suitable 
evaluation criteria in this area have been problematic with previous targets and 
performance indicators sometimes leading to unintended consequences involving corrupt 
practices and wasted resources (Seddon, 2008). Mackenzie & Hamilton-Smith (2011) have 
argued for a more sophisticated approach involving longer-term evaluations across various 
levels, that assess the evidence supporting the intervention and its impact on harm 
reduction. However, this multi-level approach is more difficult to implement and no 
examples were found of its use.  
 
Some of the limited evaluation literature on the subject has looked at the impact of legal 
powers. The pursuit of criminal assets is a prime example and although ‘follow the money’ is 
a logical response the evidence shows the confiscation process often fails (Mitchell et al., 
2015:7). Offenders adapt their behavior to prevent the seizure and confiscation of their 
wealth, for example through exploiting Hawala or other underground banking systems to 
launder money (El Rahman & El Sheikh, 2003). Whilst attempts have been made to improve 
the original UK Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, a House of Commons Select Committee Review 
(2014) identified numerous complications. These include the cost of administration, the low 
level of potential orders and the ability to recover assets. It observed, whilst 680,000 
offenders (from all types of crime), were convicted annually, only 6392 were subjected to 
orders. From those orders £490m remained outstanding, meaning only 26 pence in every 
£100 was recovered. It appears implementation challenges, rather than a shortage of legal 
instruments or law enforcement powers create the problem, and this difficulty is observed 
across Europe (EC, 2015).  
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Across each of the three themes (enforcement, disruption, prevention), examples of good 
practice can always be found. In terms of enforcement, a useful example was ‘Operation Golf’, 
a partnership predominantly between the Metropolitan Police Service and Romanian 
National Police to deal with trafficked Romanians. The 18-month initiative led to a more 
effective and efficient system in transferring intelligence/evidence between partners without 
the associated ‘Letters of Request’ bureaucracy. It also solved difficult evidential problems by 
allowing staff to operate in each other’s jurisdiction. During its duration over 20 proactive 
operations took place, with 87 OCG members and associates being arrested in the UK, 
resulting in the first British conviction for child trafficking. The project also led to a large 
quantity of cash being seized (believed to be criminal assets). Indeed, the investigation 
discovered that between 2002 and 2007 over 5,000 financial transactions, totalling 2.2m US 
dollars, took place through money service bureaus (MSBs) by suspected gang members. 
Further, as over 40 trafficked children and young people were found, important lessons were 
also learnt concerning effective care and repatriation.  
 
Unfortunately, this type of examples is ‘good’ rather than ‘common’ practice, and the lack of 
more systematic evaluation, makes it difficult to interpret the most effective way to tackle 
OC. In relation to disruption there have been some concerns as to its level of efficacy. For 
example Leong (2007), although supporting the concept of disruption, points out the 
approach relies on multi-agency partnerships, which are notoriously difficult to implement. 
Furthermore Duijin et al. (2013), in exploring 19 cases of cannabis cultivation in the 
Netherlands, found disruption had limited impact on the resilience of the network. Indeed, 
they argued the OCG learnt from the interventions and became stronger. Meanwhile Sproat 
(2012:332) pointed out that whilst disruption powers exist often they are underutilised, 
pointing to the lack of uptake on UK ancillary orders as an example.  
 
Previously in this chapter research relating to interventions underpinning a disruption 
approach relating to 99 offenders (15 OCGs) in the north of England, was described (Kirby & 
Snow, 2016). These offenders were proactively targeted by police and partner agencies 
between three months and five years (mean= 28 months), before a decision was made to 
discontinue operations against them, as they were no longer considered a threat. Kirby and 
Snow (2016), reviewed the reasons associated with this decision, and in 53.3% of cases it was 
disclosed there was no evidence to suggest their offending behavior was continuing. 
However, it was unclear whether: the attention had disrupted the group either temporarily 
or in a more sustainable fashion; the initial threat was inaccurate or exaggerated; or their 
offending was displaced in some way. Other reasons for archiving the OCG cited members 
moving away from the region, or being imprisoned. Finally, the study also tracked what had 
happened to the ‘principal’ and ‘significant’ offenders after this archiving decision had been 
made. It discovered 19 of the offenders (33.9%) had been further prosecuted for other crimes 
(mean=15.5 months), albeit it could not be ascertained whether this related to OC. Without 
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a detailed follow up, it is difficult to argue that a disruption approach generates a sustainable 
solution. 
 
In summary evaluations of OC interventions can be significantly improved. Across Europe, 
North America and Australasia, there is an increasing interest in determining ‘what works’ 
with regards to law enforcement and crime prevention. Studies have shown there is 
tremendous variability in the capacity and capability of organised crime groups and law 
enforcement agencies. This can be compounded by different levels and quality of 
intervention, with initiatives being based on insufficient or incorrect evidence, poor 
implementation, and misguided or unrealistic evaluation (Pawson & Tilley, 1997; Kirby & 
Snow, 2016). Policy makers and practitioners would be helped by a central repository of 
evaluations which explained: the central mechanisms (or theories) on which preventive 
initiatives are based; the context in which these mechanisms might best be activated to 
produce the sought-after effects; the type and level of resources needed for effective 
delivery (context); the impact (outcomes) they achieve; and the confidence with which they 
can be transferred to other environments. This type of understanding provides a clearer 
evaluation framework that enables academics and practitioners to work out what 
interventions create specific outcomes. A more robust approach to implementation and 
evaluation will provide a much stronger evidence base to establish and support different 
levels of intervention, including legislation. At the time of writing scholars were undertaking 
the first systematic review of OC for the ‘what works’ centre (College of Policing), which is a 
significant step forward. 
  
At this point in time, from a problem oriented perspective, the limited evidence suggests 
that whilst prosecution remains critical to the administration of justice, its impact in 
reducing organised crime is questionable. As such, the central business model used to tackle 
OC is both slow and cumbersome. Current operational constraints make investigation 
increasingly complex (sharing of information, jurisdictional accountability), costly (travel, 
interpreters, courts) and limited in impact (the OC often continues). It is therefore clear that 
the policing model needs to adapt to become more effective and efficient when tackling 
OCGs. As with most problem solving approaches, effectiveness appears to lie in enhanced 
partnership working, both in terms of information sharing and intervention. Multi-agency 
sources provide a richer intelligence picture. For example, a partnership of police, housing, 
social services, immigration, tax and employment departments can bring together 
information that can more readily identify actors, suspicious premises and patterns of 
behavior, to generate more innovative and sustainable responses to OC. These partnerships 
can operate at both strategic and tactical levels.  
 
This concept is not new. When Peel founded the London Metropolitan Police in 1829 he did 
so on the principle that preventative approaches were more effective than detecting the 
offence after commission. Also, that whilst the police were paid to deliver specific services, 
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it was incumbent on the rest of society to engage in the prevention of crime. Of course, we 
know that many aspects of society can influence individuals to conform to social norms (e.g. 
religion, schools and the family). Indeed, many legitimate organisations have a specific role 
in reducing the criminal opportunities available to organised crime offenders. For example, 
if banks allow investors to be secretive, or developers allow individuals to launder money 
through property, there will be continued opportunities for offenders to hide their wealth. 
More thought is required to understand how these institutions can reduce organised crime, 
and the leverage needed to persuade them to comply with anti-crime measures. In this, the 
concept of ‘super-controllers’ illustrates how regulatory bodies can have an impact on lower 
level operations (Sampson et al., 2010). A move in this direction would require a more 
reflective approach to understanding what processes facilitate OC and a more active 
engagement with regulatory bodies. At a tactical level, embedding multi-agency team 
working as core business would present more opportunities for success. Recommendations 
such as these are not without their challenges. Whilst multi-agency working and information 
sharing is theoretically persuasive, bringing together representatives from diverse and 
previously siloed agencies is difficult to implement (see Bullock et al., 2006). Whilst ‘fusion 
centres’ have emerged as an increasingly common policy approach, recent terrorist attacks 
continue to highlight the implementation challenges surrounding intelligence sharing and 
co-ordinated practice (Taylor & Russell, 2012). Ultimately however, new ideas, responses 
and skills are required to reduce the impact of OC.  
 
Conclusion 
A few years ago, leaving for home after a conference, I was in Professor Tilley’s company on 
an Amtrak train travelling the 51 miles from Providence to Boston airport. We became so 
engrossed in our ‘policing’ conversation that we were startled by the train coming to a halt. 
Observing a Boston sign on the platform he said we should disembark. We jumped off only 
to find out we should have stayed on one more stop. We then had to change platforms to 
board a crowded commuter train to continue our journey. Again, engrossed in our 
conversation, we went past our stop. Suitably embarrassed, we again changed platforms to 
reverse our route. I tell this story to warn the reader that Nick isn’t the best for providing 
geographic direction, but in terms of academic direction he’s pretty much unrivalled. 
 
Whilst the chapter has provided an overview of OC within the UK, the subtext has revolved 
around its format, which has clearly been influenced by Professor Nick Tilley. Hopefully it 
has provided an overview of the topic in a way that provides a realistic, systematic and 
critical way of engaging with the subject, with some operational relevance. Indeed, 
bizarrely, at the time of writing this chapter, I had a sense of déjà vu. Sitting close to Nick at 
a meeting, which had been convened by the Metropolitan Police to discuss the 
implementation of a new operational strategy, the chair invited comments. Nick (as he had 
done twenty years earlier when visiting Lancashire), teased open the tensions and 
challenges of the proposed approach. The Chief Superintendent smiled and said, “I wouldn’t 
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have invited you if I had known you were going to ask such hard questions”. It was as if time 
had stood still, Nick still enthusiastic and animated about operational policing, and still 
focused on the pragmatism of ‘what works’.  
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